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http://www.jstor.orgOPTIMAL SANCTIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS 
ARE IMPERFECTLY  INFORMED  ABOUT THE 
PROBABILITY OF APPREHENSION 
LUCIAN  ARYE BEBCHUK  and LOUIS  KAPLOW* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
GJARY  BECKER'S  classic  article  introduced  the  idea  that  enforcement 
effort  and  sanctions  are  substitutes  in  enforcement.1  A  lower  level  of 
enforcement  effort can be  offset  by increasing  sanctions,  which  econo- 
mizes  on enforcement  costs.  Even  activities  involving little harm should 
receive  the  maximal  sanction;  the probability of apprehension  for  such 
acts  may be reduced  in order to avoid overdeterrence.  Subsequent  arti- 
cles  have explored  and qualified Becker's  insight concerning optimal en- 
forcement  policy.2 
*  Both of Harvard University  and the National Bureau of Economic  Research.  We thank 
Howard Chang, Jesse  Fried,  Mitch Polinsky,  and Steve  Shavell for helpful comments  and 
the John M. Olin Foundation for financial support. Lucian Bebchuk's  work has also been 
supported by the National  Science  Foundation. 
l  Gary S. Becker,  Crime and Punishment: An Economic  Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.  169 
(1968). 
2 The literature has offered various explanations  for why nonmaximal sanctions  may be 
desirable: for risk aversion,  see  Louis  Kaplow,  The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of 
Fines  for  Acts  That  Definitely  Are  Undesirable,  12 Int'l  Rev.  L.  &  Econ.  3 (1992); A. 
Mitchell  Polinsky  & Steven  Shavell,  The  Optimal Tradeoff  between  the  Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines,  69 Am.  Econ.  Rev.  880 (1979); for nonmonetary  sanctions,  see  Louis 
Kaplow,  A  Note  on  the  Optimal Use  of  Nonmonetary  Sanctions,  42 J.  Pub.  Econ.  245 
(1990); A.  Mitchell  Polinsky  & Steven  Shavell,  The Optimal Use  of Fines  and Imprison- 
ment,  24 J.  Pub.  Econ.  89  (1984); for  avoidance  costs,  see  Arun S.  Malik,  Avoidance, 
Screening and Optimum Enforcement,  21 Rand J. Econ. 341 (1990); for marginal deterrence, 
see  Steven  Shavell,  A Note  on Marginal Deterrence,  Int'l Rev.  L. & Econ.  (forthcoming); 
for general enforcement,  see Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan P. L. Png, Monitoring versus Investi- 
gation  in  Law  Enforcement  and  Regulation  (unpublished  manuscript,  Univ.  California, 
Grad. School  Mgmt.  1990); Steven  Shavell,  Specific  versus General Enforcement  of Law, 
99 J. Pol.  Econ.  1088 (1991); for individuals'  differences  in wealth,  resulting in differences 
in  the  maximum  feasible  fine,  see  A.  Mitchell  Polinsky  &  Steven  Shavell,  A  Note  on 
[Journal  of Legal  Studies,  vol.  XXI  (June 1992)] 
?  1992 by The University  of Chicago.  All rights reserved.  0047-2530/92/2102-0006$01.50 
365 366  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
An  implicit  assumption  in  Becker's  analysis  of  optimal  sanctions, 
which has been  carried over to subsequent  investigations  of optimal en- 
forcement policy,  is that individuals accurately observe  the enforcement 
probability set by the government.3 While there presumably is a positive 
relationship between  actual  and perceived  levels  of  enforcement,  it  is 
implausible that individuals' probability estimates are generally accurate, 
particularly when the probability is extremely  low.  Will most individuals 
know that the  probability  of  being  ticketed  for  double  parking is  2.74 
percent while that for speeding is 0.89 percent? Indeed,  survey evidence 
on individuals' perceptions  indicates  that estimates  vary widely.4 
This article reconsiders  the problem of optimal sanctions when actors' 
information about the  probability of  apprehension  is  imperfect.  We  do 
not assume  that actors  err systematically  in one  direction or the other. 
Rather, we assume that individuals observe  the probability of apprehen- 
sion with some  noise;  consequently,  some individuals' estimates  are too 
high, and others'  too  low, with the average being unbiased. 
Our  primary result is that, when  individuals are imperfectly  informed 
in  this manner, it may  not be  optimal to set the sanction  at the highest 
feasible  level.  The reason is that a given error in observing the probability 
of  apprehension affects the expected  sanction in an amount that depends 
on  the level of the sanction.  To illustrate this, suppose that an act causes 
Optimal  Fines When  Wealth  Varies among  Individuals,  81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991);  for  individuals'  imperfect  information  about whether  acts are subject  to sanctions, see Louis 
Kaplow,  Optimal  Deterrence, Uninformed  Individuals,  and Acquiring  Information  about  Whether  Acts Are Subject  to Sanctions,  6  J.  L. Econ. & Org.  93 (1990);  and  for differences  in  the actual  probability  of apprehension,  see Lucian  A. Bebchuk  & Louis Kaplow,  Optimal  Sanctions  When Individuals  Are Imperfectly  Informed  about  the Probability  of Apprehen-  sion  (Discussion Paper No.  88, Harvard  Law School, Program  in Law and Economics 
1991). 
3  Sah independently  draws  attention  to the possibility  (and  discusses in greater  depth  the 
plausibility  of the assumption)  that  individuals'  estimates  of the probability  of apprehension  may  differ. See Raaj  K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns  of Crime,  99  J.  Pol. Econ. 1272 
(1991).  His article, however, focuses on positive analysis: he develops a model of how  different  estimates  may come about and evolve over time and draws  implications  for how  crime  rates may be affected.  In  contrast, we explore the normative  question-which  he  explicitly  reserves-of  how different probability  estimates affect optimal enforcement 
policy.  4  Sah discusses some of the findings.  See id. Work  reporting  or employing  such evidence  includes  James J.  Teevan,  Jr.,  Perceptions  of Punishment:  Current  Research,  in Perception  in  Criminology (Richard  L. Henshel & Robert  A. Silverman  eds. 1975);  Claude  Montmar- 
quette  & Marc  Nerlove, Deterrence  and  Delinquency:  An Analysis  of Individual  Data, 1  J.  Quantitative  Criminology  37 (1985); Jerry  Parker  & Harold  G. Grasmick,  Linking  Actual  and  Perceived Certainty  of Punishment,  17 Criminology  366 (1979);  Pamela Richards  &  Charles  R. Tittle, Socioeconomic  Status and Perceptions  of Personal  Arrest  Probabilities, 
20  Criminology  329  (1982). OPTIMAL  SANCTIONS  367 
a harm of 10. The maximum  possible sanction is 500, so optimal deter- 
rence could be achieved with a probability  of 2 percent. Alternatively, 
one could employ a sanction of  100 and a probability  of  10 percent. 
Suppose, however, that half the individuals  overestimate  the probability 
by one percentage  point and the other half underestimate  it by the same 
amount. For the first regime, half face an expected sanction of  15 (3 
percent x  500), and half face an expected sanction of 5 (1 percent x 
500); for the alternative regime, half face  11 (11 percent x  100) and 
half 9 (9 percent x  100). Clearly, under the former regime, there will 
be greater  overdeterrence  for the individuals  who overestimate  the prob- 
ability and greater  underdeterrence  for those who underestimate  it than 
under the latter regime. If the resulting loss  in welfare exceeds  the 
cost of raising the actual probability  from 2 percent to 10 percent, the 
latter  regime would be superior. 
This example assumes that the magnitude  of noise in individuals'  esti- 
mates is independent  of the probability  of apprehension.  The phenome- 
non, however, is more general.  Even if the magnitude  of errors  in individ- 
uals' estimates increases as the probability  of apprehension  increases, 
there will still be an improvement  in behavior  as long as the relative size 
of the error  falls. Thus, in the example, as long as individuals'  errors  are 
less than 5 percentage points when the probability  of apprehension  is 
raised to 10 percent, expected sanctions  will be closer together  under  the 
regime with a higher probability  and lower sanction, and problems of 
over- and underdeterrence  will be less. 
In the next section, we present our model and analysis, after which we 
offer brief concluding remarks concerning the empirical  importance  of 
the phenomenon  we address. 
II.  MODEL 
A.  Framework  for Analysis 
Risk-neutral  individuals  choose whether  to commit an act that benefits 
the actor by b, which is assumed to be distributed  uniformly  in the inter- 
val [0, 1]. Acts impose a social cost, h. We assume h < 1, so that some 
acts are socially beneficial. 
The government  chooses a probability  of enforcement,  p, and a sanc- 
tion, s, so as to maximize  the sum of individuals'  benefits  minus  the harm 
caused  by their acts and enforcement  costs, x(p). We assume x' > 0 and 
x" >  0-that  is,  enforcement effort is  subject to diminishing  returns. 
Moreover,  the maximum  feasible sanction is s,  which can be interpreted 
as the maximum  wealth of individuals  where the sanction is a fine. We 368  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
assume further that the sanction is costless  to impose,  as in the familiar 
Becker framework. 
We depart from that familiar model by assuming that actors are imper- 
fectly informed about p. Specifically,  individuals observe p with an error: 
they observe  eitherp  +  e(p)  or p  -  e(p),  each with 50 percent probabil- 
ity.  The government  cannot  observe  each actor's  estimate.  We analyze 
first the baseline  case  in which  e(p)  =  0 for all p and then the case  in 
which e(p)  >  O. 
B.  Perfect  Information 
When individuals  accurately  observe  the probability of apprehension, 
all obviously  observe  the same p. The government's  problem is to choose 
p and s so as to maximize 
f|  (b -  h)db  -  x(p),  (1) 
ps 
subject to the constraint that s <  s. The Becker result is immediate. 
PROPOSITION  1.  When  individuals  accurately  observe  the  probability 
of apprehension,  the optimal sanction is maximal. 
Proof.  As  one  increases  s and reduces  x so  as to keep ps  constant, 
the first term in (1) is unaffected,  and the magnitude of the second  term 
falls,  so the optimum is where the constraint is binding. Q.E.D. 
C.  Imperfect  Information 
When  e(p)  >  0,  individual  probability  estimates  differ.  The  govern- 
ment's  problem is to choose  p and s so as to maximize 
1 
f1  (b -  h)db  + -|  (b -  h)db  -  x(p),  (2) 
2  [p+ee(pp)]s  2 
+ 
[  p-e(p)]s 
subject to the constraint that s <  s. 
PROPOSITION  2.  When individuals observe the probability of apprehen- 
sion subject to an error, the optimal sanction may be less than the maxi- 
mal one. 
Proof.  Begin with s  =  s,  and let p-  denote  the optimal probability of 
apprehension  given  s.  Consider  the  effect  on  welfare  of  raising p  and 
reducing s,  such that ps remains fixed.  Taking the derivative  of (2) with 
respect  to p,  with ds/dp  =  -s/p,  we obtain 
2[h  -  (p  +  e)s](se'  -  es/p)  +  2[h  -  (p  -  e)s](eslp  -  se')  -  x' 
(3) 
=  (e/p  -  e')es2  -  x', OPTIMAL  SANCTIONS  369 
where e' denotes deldp. If one assumes  that, at (p, s), d(e/p)/dp  < 0-that 
is, that the percentage error falls as p rises-the  first term is positive, 
reflecting  an improvement  in welfare from an improvement  in behavior. 
It can readily be demonstrated that for enforcement technologies for 
which x' is not too large, the entire expression will be positive.5 Q.E.D. 
The intuition  behind  proposition  2 is as follows. Beginning  at the maxi- 
mum  feasible sanction  and the probability  that is optimal  given this sanc- 
tion, a reduction  in the sanction  accompanied  by an increase  in the proba- 
bility that keeps the actual expected sanction constant will improve 
behavior whenever the relative size of the error-the  ratio of the error 
to the actual probability-falls  as the probability  rises. (The example in 
Section I had this characteristic:  the error  was constant, so the relative 
error declined as  the probability was  increased.) Behavior improves 
because the  perceived expected sanctions-(p  +  e)s  for some and 
(p -  e)s for others-move  closer together. As a result, those who over- 
estimate the probability  are overdeterred  less, and those who underesti- 
mate  the probability  are underdeterred  less.6 As long as it is not too costly 
to raise the probability  somewhat, the optimum  will involve a sanction 
that is not maximal. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We have examined  the problem  of optimal  enforcement  when individu- 
als are imperfectly  informed  about  the probability  of apprehension.  When 
individuals  observe this probability  with some random  error, it may be 
optimal  to employ less than the maximum  feasible sanction  with a greater 
probability  of apprehension.  While  raising  the probability  is costly, it may 
improve behavior. Behavior improves if the error is a lower fraction 
of the actual probability  as this probability  increases because less of a 
5 The demonstration is complicated  only by the fact that the first term must be evaluated 
at p, which itself depends on the technology  x(p).  Examples can most easily be constructed 
using  a  less  direct  technique  that  avoids  this  interdependence.  Set  s  =  s,  and  choose 
probability p that maximizes  the sum of the first two terms in (2)-that  is, p =  h/s  -  ee'. 
(Assume  that the  parameters  are such  that p  <  1. Note  that p >  p.)  Then consider  s  = 
s/A  and p =  Ap, where A e (1, 1/p). Assume  that d(elp)ldp  <  0 forp  e [p, p], so that behavior 
is better at the lower sanction and higher probability. Compute the degree to which welfare 
is greater as a result  of  this  behavioral  effect.  Finally,  assume  that x(p)  is less  than this 
benefit, which completes  the example. 
6 Depending  on x(p),  it may be  that the  optimal probability at s involves  both groups 
being underdeterred. It is nonetheless  true that behavior improves: the social benefit from 
reducing  underdeterrence  of  those  underdeterred  substantially  exceeds  the  loss  from in- 
creasing  underdeterrence  of  those  underdeterred  modestly,  as  the  harm caused  by  both 
groups' acts is the same,  but the benefit for the marginal individual in the former group is 
less  than that for the latter. 370  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
divergence  in perceived  expected  sanctions  will result.  If behavior  im- 
proves  sufficiently,  the higher enforcement  cost  will be warranted. 
The  importance  of  this phenomenon  depends  on the  relationship  be- 
tween  individuals'  errors in estimating  the  probability  of  apprehension 
and the  actual probability.  The  example  we  offered  in the  introduction 
suggests  the plausibility of the assumption that errors are a greater frac- 
tion of  the probability when  probabilities  are very  low  than when  they 
are higher. To guide enforcement policy,  empirical research on this point 
would  be  useful.  For  example,  one  might attempt  to  infer probability 
perceptions  from behavior,  which  could  be  accomplished  in an experi- 
mental  setting,  or  to  survey  individuals  concerning  their  perceptions. 
Work in cognitive  psychology  concerning  probability perceptions  might 
also  illuminate  the  issue.  Finally,  one  could  examine  analytically  how 
individuals'  probability estimates  based on given priors and limited sets 
of observations  differ when  the probability generating the observations 
differs.7 Such  research  might reveal  that relative errors are rather large 
for probabilities  of  apprehension  that otherwise  would  be  optimal with 
maximal sanctions,  while much lower for the probabilities and sanctions 
actually observed. 
7 Sah's model, supra note 3, assumes individuals'  estimates are determined  by their 
limited  observations.  For his purposes,  only the crime  rate  and  not the magnitude  of individ- 
uals' errors  is relevant, so he does not explore how such errors  may be affected by the 
actual  probability  of apprehension. 